

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 USBERL 01939 01 OF 03 161557Z

47

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-02 INR-07 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 IO-13

ACDA-07 /079 W

----- 015259

R 161445Z SEP 76

FM USMISSION USBERLIN

TO AMEMBASSY BONN

INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 3098

RUFHJA /AMEBASSY BERLIN UNN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY PARIS

USMISSION NATO

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 USBERLIN 1939

E.O.11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PGOV, WB, UR, EC

SUBJECT:RECENT SOVIET STATEMENTS ON QA AND EC--IS THERE A NEW
POLICY?

1. SUMMARY: WITH AUGUST 3 SOVIET PROTEST ON EC PARLIAMENTARY
ELECTIONS, AUGUST 13 INTERFERENCE ON TRANSIT ROUTES,
AND FIFTH ANNIVERSARY OF SIGNING OF QUADRIpartite AGREE-
MENT, WE HAVE HAD AN UNUSUALLY LARGE NUMBER OF STATEMENTS,
COMMENTARIES AND PROGNOSTICATIONS IN PAST MONTH ABOUT
NATURE OF SOVIET BERLIN POLICY. AS ALWAYS, ESTABLISHED
FACTS ARE FEW AND CONTRADICTORY ENOUGH THAT THEY CAN BE
FITTED INTO ALMOST ANY THEORY THAT BEHOLDER WISHES TO
ESPOUSE. WE SEE LITTLE EVIDENCE, HOWEVER, OF AN INNOVATIVE
OR SHARPENED SOVIET POLICY. RATHER WE BELIEVE THAT THE
SOVIETS HAVE RESPONDED TO EVENTS AS THEY HAVE ARISEN WITHIN
THE FRAMEWORK OF THEIR WELL-ESTABLISHED POLICY WHICH IN-
CLUDES (A) USING BERLIN'S GEOGRAPHY TO INFLUENCE FRG AND
ALLIED POLICY THEIR WAY; (B) CITING THE QA (AS THEY
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 USBERL 01939 01 OF 03 161557Z

INTERPRET IT) AS A MAJOR SUCCESS OF BREZHNEVIAN DETENTE; AND

(C) NERVOUSNESS OVER ANY BERLIN DEVELOPMENT THAT MIGHT CALL INTO QUESTION THEIR BELIEF THAT OVER LONG RUN WEST BERLIN WILL FALL INTO THEIR LAP. WHILE SOVIETS WILL NOT BE SHY ABOUT USING (A) WHEN OCCASION ARISES, WE THINK (B) IS STILL MAJOR ELEMENT IN THEIR DAY TO DAY CALCULATIONS. RISK OF EC ISSUE IS THAT IT WILL STIR UP SOVIET LONG TERM CONCERN (C), BUT WE DOUBT MOSCOW HAS YET MADE ANY FIRM DECISION OVER EXTENT OF ITS RESPONSE TO INDIRECT BERLIN PARTICIPATION IN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS. WE WOULD HOPE THAT TIMELY ALLIED RESPONSE TO LAST MONTH'S PROTEST AND PERHAPS SOME QUIET ADDITIONAL WORDS ON SUITABLE OCCASIONS WILL ENCOURAGE SOVIETS NOT TO PAINT THEMSELVES PREMATURELY INTO CORNER. END SUMMARY.

2. PESSIMISTS IN BERLIN FRATERNITY, NOTABLY PUNDITS OF SPRINGER PRESS, HAVE HAD OPPORTUNITY TO DISCERN OMINOUS TRENDS IN PAST MONTH. AUGUST 13 TRANSIT DISRUPTION WAS A SERIOUS VIOLATION OF QA. GDR, WITH MODULATED BUT OPEN SOVIET SUPPORT, HAS ADVANCED DANGEROUS THESIS THAT TRANSIT PROVISIONS OF QA ARE SUBORDINATE TO GDR SOVEREIGN RIGHTS. SED'S HAERMANN AXEN HAS EVEN RESURRECTED DANZIGIAN CONCEPT OF CORRIDORS TO DENY THAT SUCH EXIST BETWEEN BERLIN AND THE FRG. MUCH SPECULATION HAS BEEN DEVOTED TO PUBLICIZED FACT THAT HONECKER INDICATED TO GAUS AUGUST 12 THAT GDR WISHED TO AVOID ESCALATION OF DIFFICULTIES WITH FRG LESS THAN 24 HOURS BEFORE VOPOS MOUNTED THEIR WELL-PLANNED BUS BLITZ. TO THOSE WHO WISH TO FIND A CONSISTENT PATTERN IN ALL EVENTS THERE HAS BEEN TEMPTATION TO INTERPRET THIS LAST FACT AS MEANING THAT GDR WISHED TO KEEP THINGS QUIET ON AUGUST 13 BUT SOVIETS, FOR PURPOSES OF THEIR OWN, ORDERED THAT STERNFAHRTERS BE TURNED BACK. WHAT THOSE SOVIET PURPOSES MIGHT BE, IT IS SUGGESTED, CAN BE DISCERNED FROM CONCURRENT SOVIET CAMPAIGN AGAINST BERLIN'S TIES TO EC. THIS VIEW HAS IT THAT SOVIETS ARE PUSHING FOR A BERLIN CONFRONTATION EITHER BECAUSE THEY HAVE CONCLUDED THAT EC QUESTION MUST BE DECIDED ONCE AND FOR ALL, OR THAT TIME IS RIPE FOR A RENEGOTIATION OF QA WHICH WOULD SHIFT BALANCE FURTHER IN THEIR FAVOR. SOVIET DESIRE TO ENGAGE IN SOME SORT OF COMMON FOUR POWER STATEMENT ON ANNIVERSARY OF QA SIGNING IS THEN INTERPRETED AS EITHER A PLOT

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 USBERL 01939 01 OF 03 161557Z

TO ENTICE US INTO SUCH NEGOTIATIONS OR TO BAGATELLIZE SIGNIFICANCE OF AUGUST 13 HAPPENINGS. A VARIANT TO THIS LINE OF THOUGHT FOCUSES ON RECENT SOVIET STATEMENTS, FOR EXAMPLE IN PUBLISHED SOVIET RESPONSE TO AUGUST 26 ALLIED PROTEST OF TRANSIT VIOLATIONS AND EVEN EARLIER IN SOVIET MAY 22 STATEMENT ON RELATIONS WITH FRG, THAT EASTERN FULFILLMENT OF QA OBLIGATIONS IS DEPENDENT UPON DEVELOPMENT OF GOOD RELATIONS BETWEEN FRG AND WARSAW PACT

STATES. CONCERN EXPRESSED IN THIS CONNECTION IS THAT EVENTS OF AUGUST 13 AND ANTI-EC RUMBLINGS PRESAGE MORE ACTIVE SOVIET PRESSURE ON BERLIN TO COMPEL FRG FOREIGN POLICY CONCESSIONS.

3. SOME OF ABOVE TEA LEAF READINGS MAY BE PLAUSIBLE, BUT WE THINK A HELATHY SKEPTICISM IS IN ORDER. ADDRESSEES WILL RECALL THAT SPRING 1975 WAS LAST TIME COMMENTATORS MADE MAJOR EFFORT TO PERCEIVE DRAMATIC SOVIET POLICY INTIATIVES ON BERLIN. FOCUS OF SPECULATION THEN WAS NUMBER OF SOVIET PROTESTS THAT FOLLOWED CLOSELY YPON EACH OTHER, MOST MILITANT OF WHICH WAS LETTER ON BERLIN STATUS CIRCULATED IN UN AT CLIMAX OF DISPUTE ON LISTING OF BERLIN STATISTICS IN UN DEMOGRAPHIC YEARBOOK. PRO-LIFERATION OF THESE PROTESTS WAS LINKED IN EYES OF SOME BEHOLDERS WITH RETURN OF PYOTR ABARSIMOV TO HIS EAST BERLIN PROCONSULATE. WITH PASSAGE OF TIME, MORE PER-SUASIVE INTERPRETATIONOF THOSE EVENTS CAME TO BE THAT THEY WERE DICTATED MORE BY COINCIDENCES OF TIMING THAN CONSCIOUS PLAN.

4. ABRASIMOV'S QA ANNIVERSARY ARTILE IN NEUES DEUTSCHALN (USBERLIN 1848), BY FAR MOST EXTENSIVE OF RECENT SOVIET STATEMENTS, PROBABLY PROVIDES BEST JUMPING OFF PLACE FOR ANALYSIS OF PRESENT SOVIET VIEWS ON BERLIN. PRESUMABLY IT REPRESENTS IN EXPANDED AND MAXIMALIST FORM MUCH OF WHAT SOVIETS WOULD HAVE LIKED TO HAVE HAD QUADRIPARTITE IMPRIMATUR FOR WHEN THEY PRO-POSED COMMON COMMEMORATIVE DOCUMENT. AS WE READ IT, ABRASIMOV STATEMENT IS ESSENTIALLY POSITIVIE. ABRASIMOV EMPHASIZES SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENTS QA HAS BROUGHT TO BERLIN AND ROLE QA PLAYED IN ADVANCING DETENTE AND PAVING WAY FOR CSCE. HE GOES OUT OF HIS WAY TO PRAISE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 USBERL 01939 01 OF 03 161557Z

ALLIES, NOTING THAT NEGOTIATIONS WERE DIFFICULT, AND THAT "THE SOVIET UNION VALUES HIGHLY THE COOPERATION WHICH OCCURRED WITH THE US, FRANCE AND ENGLAND IN THIS QUESTION." THERE IS OBLIGATORY PRAISE FOR GDR CONTRIBU-TIONS BOTH TO DEVELOPMENT OF QA AND TO ITS IMPLEMENTATION, BUT THESE SEEM TO BE PLACED BELOW THOSE OF FOUR POWERS. THERE ARE ALSO ALLUSIONS TO GDR CLAIMS OF SOVEREIGN CON-TROL OF TRANSIT, BUT THESE ARE AGAIN LESS SPECIFIC THAN THOSE TRUMPETED BY AXEN OR PUT OUT BY BOTH GDR AND SOVIETS IN IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH OF AUGUST 13 DIFFICULTIES (I.3., "THE COMPETENT GDR ORGANS HAVE PERFORMED A TRULY MIGHTY JOB, IN PARTICULAR TO ENSURE TROUBLE-FREE AND CORRECT TRAFFIC ON THE TRANSIT ROADS OF THE GDR WHICH ARE USED YEARLY BY MILLIONS OF PEOPLE"). THERE ARE AGAIN ALLUSIONS TO THE CONCEPT THAT BOTH BERLIN AND THE FRG

MUST BEHAVE THEMSELVES IF QA IS TO WORK BUT EXACT
NATURE FO LINKAGE IS RATHER BLURRED. THUS, WEST BERLIN

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 USBERL 01939 02 OF 03 161611Z

47

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-02 INR-07 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 IO-13

ACDA-07 /079 W

----- 015516

R 161445Z SEP 76

FM USMISSION USBERLIN

TO AMEMBASSY BONN

INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 2099

AMEMBASSY BERLIN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY PARIS

USMISSION NATO

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 3 USBERLIN 1939

MUST, ACCORDING TO SOVIET AMBASSADOR, BEHAVE ITSELF, CEASE
TO BE USED AS "A FORWARD CENTER IN THE FIGHT AGAINST THE
SOCIALIST LANDS, ESPECIALLY THE GDR, IN ORDER TO LEAD A
NORMAL QUIET LIFE IN THE SPIRIT OF RECIPROCAL UNDERSTANDING
AND GOOD NEIGHBORLINESS." THERE IS, HOWEVER, NO EXPLICIT
THREAT THAT UNLESS THE WESTERN GERMANS BEHAVE BERLIN WILL
SUFFER. INSTEAD ABRASIMOV DEFTLY USES SOMEWHAT LESS OFFENSIVE
ARGUMENT THAT THERE IS "SERIOUS DANGER IN FUTURE" ONLY IF
"CERTAIN CIRCLES IN THE WEST" ATTEMPT TO "TURN THE
PROBLEM ON ITS HEAD" BY INSISTING THAT PROCESS OF DETENTE
IN EUROPE DEPENDS UPON SOVIETS AND THEIR ALLIES ACCEPT-
ING "ILLEGAL" FRG CLAIMS TO WEST BERLIN AND CONCURRING IN
EFFORTS TO "ANCHOR AND EVEN TO EXPAND THE SO-CALLED
'FEDERAL PRESENCE' IN THE CITY." MILD TONE OF ABRASIMOV'S
PIECE IS EMPHASIZED BY HIS FAILURE TO NAME VILLAINS OF PIECE
FROM SOVIET POINT OF VIEW. ABRASIMOV NOTES THAT "MAJORITY
OF LEADING POLITICIANS IN WESTERN LANDS" SHARE A POSITIVE
ASSESSMENT OF QA, AND HE SPECIFICALLY INCLUDES THE

SECRETARY, CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT AND GOVERNING MAYOR SCHUETZ,
LATTER OFTEN A FAVORITE WHIPPING BOY,
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 USBERL 01939 02 OF 03 161611Z

IN THIS MAJORITY. PERHAPS AWARE OF DANGERS OF APPEARING
TO TAKE SIDES IN UPCOMING FRG ELECTION,
HOWEVER, BAD GUYS GO UNNAMED. THEY ARE MERELY "CERTAIN
CIRCLES." THERE IS, IN OTHER WORDS, LITTLE SUPPORT FOR A
THESIS THAT SOVIETS NOW SEE QA AS MORE A LEVER TO INFLU-
ENCE FRG OSTPOLITIK THAN AS A BUILDING BLOCK OF THEIR
POLICY TOWARD DETENTE IN GENERAL AS US IN PARTICULAR.

5. OF COURSE ALL IS NOT SWEETNESS AND LIGHT. THERE IS
NO INDICATION SOVIETS ARE PREPARED TO RELAX THEIR FIVE YEAR
OLD CAMPAIGN TO ESTABLISH THEIR OWN INTERPRETATION OF QA'S
MORE DELPHIC PROVISIONS. TWO SPECIFIC PASSAGES CONTAIN
TROUBLING IMPLICATIONS. IN FIRST ABRASIMOV, AFTER MAKING
STANDARD PITCH THAT QA WAS CAREFULLY WORKED OUT BALANCE
OF INTERESTS, STATES "IN OTHER WORDS, EACH SIDE FULFILLS
THE OBLIGATIONS IT HAS UNDERTAKEN INsofar AND IN
THE MEASURE THAT THE OTHER SIDE DOES."IN SECOND, ABRASIMOV
SINGLES OUT EC ELECTIONS AS A LOOMING PROBLEM STATING
UNEQUIVOCALLY THAT "THERE CAN NOT BE TWO
MEANINGS: THE DIRECT OR INDIRECT PARTICIPATION OF
WEST BERLIN IN ELECTIONS TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT,
THE EXTENSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY'S COMPETENCE
TO THIS CITY, WOULD MEAN A REVISION OF THE STATUS OF
WEST BERLIN AS IT IS ESTABLISHED IN THE QUADRIpartite
AGREEMENT AND OTHER FOUR POWER DECISIONS AND UNDER-
STANDINGS."

6. THESE WARNINGS NEED TO BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY, BUT THEY
DO NOT SEEM TO US TO BE CENTRAL POINT AND PURPOSE OF
ABRASIMOV'S ESSAY. THAT WE FIND IN HIS JUDGMENT THAT
"THE TOTAL RESULT OF THE FACT OF THE QA'S EXISTENCE IS
WITHOUT DOUBT POSITIVE,"AND IN LINKAGE OF QA TO
BREZHNEV'S DETENTE POLICY. SEPTEMBER 3, 1976 SEEMS THUS
TO BE MORE AN OCCASION FOR SOVIETS TO PRAISE GREAT MEN
(PRIMARILY THEIR OWN OF COURSE) THAN TO SOUND ALARM BELLS
OR LAY FOUNDATION FOR A REOPENING OF BASIC BERLIN
QUESTIONS. OUR CONCLUSION IS STRENGTHENED BY READING
THE REPORT OF SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO FRG FALIN'S
COMMENT SEPTEMBER 7 THAT QA IS NOT ONLY IN SOVIET EYES
OPTIMUM POSSIBLE AT PRESENT BUT PROBABLY IN HISTORICAL
TERMS OPTIMUM THAT WILL BE POSSIBLE (BONN 15262). THIS IS A
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 USBERL 01939 02 OF 03 161611Z

TWO EDGED COMMENT TO BE SURE, BUT CERTAINLY ARGUES AGAINST NOTION THAT DESIRE FOR NEW QA TALKS WAS BEHIND AUGUST DIFFICULTIES. THERE IS ACCORDINGLY REASON TO SUSPECT THAT IT WAS NOT ENTIRELY IN SOVIET INTEREST THAT AUGUST 13 PRODUCED EVENTS THAT TARNISHED FIFTH ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATION. WHY THEN WAS THERE TROUBLE ON AUGUST 13? PROBABLY BECAUSE GDR, DESPITE ITS SEAT IN UN, RAFT OF OLYMPIC GOLD MEDALS AND OTHER SHINY NEW INDICIA OF INTERNATIONAL RESPECTABILITY, REMAINS SUFFICIENTLY BURDENED BY AN INFERIORITY COMPLEX AND OPPRESSIVE SENSE OF INTERNAL SECURITY THAT IT FELT REQUIRED NOT ONLY TO CELEBRATE 15TH ANNIVERSARY OF WALL IN PROVOCATIVE WAY BUT TO OVERREACT TO ALL SIGNS THAT WEST STILL LOATHES WALL. WE WOULD SEE HONECKER'S ASSURANCES TO GAUS AUGUST 12 NOT AS SIGN THAT GDR DID NOT INTEND OR WISH TO ACT STRONGLY ON ITS HIGHLY SENSITIVE ANNIVERSARY BUT THAT IT DID NOT WISH INCIDENT TO ESCALATE OUT OF CONTROL. SUBSEQUENT WORDS AND ACTIONS BY SENIOR GDR OFFICIALS LEND FURTHER CREDENCE TO THIS INTERPRETATION. DYNAMICS OF SOVIET-GDR RELATIONSHIP ARE ALWAYS DIFFICULT TO FATHOM BUT WE DOUBT THAT SOVIETS WOULD HAVE MUCH CHOICE BUT TO SUPPORT THEIR ALLY ON SUCH AN ISSUE. TRANSIT ROUTE PRESSURE IS AFTER ALL AN OLD PRESSURE TACTIC THAT FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL OFFICE PROBLEM IN 1974 ALREADY SHOWED HAS SURVIVED ADVENT OF QA ERA.

7. EC ISSUE IS POTENTIALLY MORE FAR REACHING. IT PROBABLY TOUCHES UPON BASIC SOVIET PERCEPTION OF HOW BERLIN SITUATION SHOULD EVOLVE. AGAIN CLUE MAY LIE IN ABRASIMOV'S ARTICLE, AT CONCLUSION OF WHICH HE DENIES ASSERTION WHICH HE ATTRIBUTES TO WEST THAT SOVIETS "SEEK TO ISOLATE WEST BERLIN FROM INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC, SCIENTIFIC, TECHNICAL AND CULTURAL INTER-COURSE." ABRASIMOV GOES TO GREAT LENGTH, IN FOUR PARAGRAPHS, TO REBUT THIS "PURE INVENTION" BY CITING RANGE OF WAYS IN WHICH SOVIETS SEEK TO ESTABLISH THEIR OWN TIES TO CITY, FROM DELIVERIES OF OIL AND MACHINERY, THROUGH VISITS OF SOVIET ARTISTS AND PARTICIPATION IN BERLIN FILM FESTIVAL. THUS, "THE HAPPY TRANSFORMATION IN THE CONTACTS AND EXCHANGES
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 USBERL 01939 02 OF 03 161611Z

BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND WEST BERLIN ARE A RESULT OF THE QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENT AND OF THE GENERAL WARMING OF THE POLITICAL CLIMATE WHICH FOLLOWED ITS CONCLUSION. SIX OR SEVEN YEARS AGO IT WOULD HAVE BEEN UNTHINKABLE."

8. THIS SEEMS TO US TO COME CLOSE TO HEART OF MATTER.

QA PLAYED AND STILL PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN SOVIET OVERALL DETENTE POLICY. REDUCED TO ITS GERMAN DIMENSIONS, HOWEVER, SOVIETS SEE IT AS A MEANS TO KEEP BERLIN SITUATION QUIET WHILE PRESERVING AND IF AT ALL POSSIBLE FACILITATING GRADUAL SHIFT IN CITY'S DEPENDENCE EASTWARD. THERE ARE LIKELY REAL DIFFERENCES IN EMPHASIS AND PERHAPS ULTIMATE OBJECTIVES BETWEEN GDR AND SOVIETS ON WHERE THIS RPOCESS MIGHT ULTIMATELY LEAD (INCORPORATION INTO GDR VERSUS HON KONG TYPE FREE CITY ORIENTED TOWARD EAST, FOR EXAMPLE). FOR A LEAST MEDIUM RANGE, HOWEVER, A COMMON THRUST CAN BE PERCEIVED, ARTICULATED PERHAPS MOST CLEARLY IN FAMOUS ARTICLE 7 OF 1975 SOVIET-GDR TREATY WHICH IMPLIED THAT BERLIN'S TIES TO FRG SHOULD BE REDUCED WHILE ITS TIES TO EAST ARE BUILT UP. ABRASIMOV'S ARTICLE POINTS OUT THE PRACTICAL STEPS WHICH SOVIETS ARE ATTEMPTING TO TAKE TO DEMONSTRATE TO BERLINERS THAT THEIR LONG RANGE FUTURE LIES WITH A MORE EASTWARD ORIENTATION. LIMITATIONS ON WHAT FRG CAN DO HERE, AT LEAST IN FORMAL AND LEGALISTIC TERMS, HAVE LONG SINCE BEEN DEVELOPED AND ARE TO CONSIDERABLE EXTEND CODIFIED IN QA. EC, HOWEVER, IS JOKER IN PACK. WE SUSPECT SOVIETS ARE IN EARNEST WHEN THEY SAY THAT THEY ARE CONCERNED THAT RECENT INCREASED EC ACTIVITY IN AND ABOUT BERLIN IS TRICK TO SMUGGLE CITY INTO NEW GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONSHIP TO FRG VIA BRUSSELS. EVEN MORE, HOWEVER, SOVIETS MAY FEAR THAT LINKAGE OF CITY TO A FORWARD MOVING WESTERN EUROPE BY MEANS OF EC, A RELATIONSHIP WHOSE LIMITATIONS ARE NOWHERE NEARLY SO CAREFULLY SPELLED OUT AS THAT OF FRG AND BERLIN, MAY SERVE TO PROVIDE BERLINERS WITH THAT LONG TERM ASSURANCE OF WESTERN SUPPORT THAT CAN MAKE MOCKERY OF INEVITABILITY OF BERLIN'S ULTIMATE REORIENTATION EASTWARD.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 USBERL 01939 03 OF 03 161619Z

47

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-02 INR-07 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 IO-13

ACDA-07 /079 W

----- 015740

R 161445Z SEP 76

FM USMISSION USBERLIN
TO AMEMBASSY BONN
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 3100
AMEMBASSY BERLIN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USMISSION NATO
USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 3 USBERLIN 1939

9. EC, HOWEVER, IS RELATIVELY UNKNOWN QUANTITY TO SOVIETS IN MORE WAYS THAN ITS RELATIONS WITH BERLIN. IT SEEMS TO US SOVIETS HAVE ONLY RELATIVELY RECENTLY BEGUN TO TAKE REAL NOTE OF ORGANIZATION'S POTENTIAL FOR POLITICAL UNION, AND IT IS UNLIKELY SOVIETS ANY MORE THAN WEST ITSELF HAS ANY GOOD IDEA ABOUT HOW FAST AND HOW EFFECTIVELY A TRUE INTEGRATIVE PROCESS WILL PROCEED. IF ALL IS GOING WELL IN BRUSSELS IN 1978 SO THAT INAUGURATION OF FIRST DIRECTLY ELECTED PARLIAMENT IS SEEN AS A MAJOR CONSTITUTIVE STEP TOWARD A FUNCTIONING SUPRANATIONAL GOVERNMENT WITH FULL RANGE OF SOVEREIGN POWERS, WE CAN IMAGINE SOVIETS GIVING SERIOUS THOUGHT TO TAKING A STRONGER LINE IN BERLIN THAN IF EC IS RELATIVELY DEAD IN WATER. IN LATTER CASE, DIRECT ELECTIONS MIGHT BE LITTLE MORE THAN A GIMMICK WHICH PROPONENTS OF EUROPEAN UNITY MIGHT HOPE WOULD REVIVE A DREAM RATHER THAN INAUGURATE A NEW AND TO SOVIETS DISTURBING ERA. PUT ANOTHER WAY, BERLIN'S LINKAGE TO A SERIOUS PARLIAMENT MIGHT IN SOVIET EYES BE A BIG VIOLATION OF QA WHILE ITS CONTINUED LINKAGE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 USBERL 01939 03 OF 03 161619Z

TO AN ONLY SLIGHTLY MORE PRESTIGIOUS DEBATING SOCIETY WOULD BE ONLY A LITTLE VIOLATION. THIS BRINGS BACK TO MIND ABRASIMOV'S FORMULA: "...EACH SIDE FULFILLS THE OBLIGATIONS IT HAS UNDERTAKEN INsofar AND IN THE MEASURE THAT THE OTHER SIDE DOES." TRANSLATED INTO OPERATIONAL TERMS, WE WOULD SEE SOVIET STATEMENTS ON EC OVER PAST WEEKS AS AN EFFORT TO ISSUE A WARNING, AS REFLECTIVE OF A REAL CONCERN, BUT NOT YET DETERMINATIVE OF RESPONSE WHICH SOVIETS WILL MAKE WHEN BERLIN HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FOR NEW PARLIAMENT IN TWO YEARS TIME.

10. MAXIMALIST SOVIET AND WESTERN CONCEPTS ABOUT WHERE QA SHOULD LEAD BERLIN AND ABOUT WHAT EC SHOULD MEAN IN THIS CITY ARE UNLIKELY, OF COURSE, TO BE RECONCILABLE. FOR THIS REASON WE AGREE WITH ARGUMENTATION IN STATE 219657 THAT ALLIES SHOULD SEEK TO AVOID ANY SORT OF RESPONSE TO SOVIET AUGUST 3 PROTEST THAT MIGHT LEAD INTO

DISCUSSION OF ULTIMATE OBJECTIVES. OUR LONGER RANGE INTERESTS IN CITY PROBABLY REQUIRE THAT WE SEEK TO FOCUS ATTENTION ON LIMITED, CONSERVATIVE NATURE OF INDIVIDUAL STEPS KEEPING IN MIND THAT MANY OF MOST IMPORTANT FACTORS GOVERNING NATURE OF SOVIET RESPONSES ARE TIED TO SITUATIONS FAR BEYOND CITY'S BOUNDARIES SUCH AS PROGRESS TOWARD OR LACK THEREOF OF REAL POLITICAL UNITY IN BRUSSELS AND EVOLUTION OF SOVIET PERCEPTION OF THEIR WORLD-WIDE RELATIONSHIP WITH US OF WHICH BERLIN IS ONLY A FRACTIONAL, IF INTEGRAL, PART.

11. CERTAIN BLURRING AROUND EDGES OF OUR DOCTRINAL POSITION AND OUR RATIONALE FOR DEFINITIVE BERLIN-EC RELATIONSHIP THUS MAY BE USEFUL. AT SAME TIME, HOWEVER, WE WOULD THINK IT USEFUL TO SUPPLEMENT CONCISE FORMAL RESPONSE TO SOVIET AUGUST 3 PROTEST WITH INFORMAL COMMENTS BY AUTHORITATIVE ALLIED FIGURES AS OCCASIONS ARISE TO EFFECT THAT WE CONSIDER OUR POSITION ON SPECIFIC PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION ISSUE MODERATE, REASONABLE AND NON-NEGOTIABLE. WE RECOGNIZE THAT THERE IS ALWAYS SOME DANGER THAT SOVIETS WILL MISREAD SIGNALS AND THINK WE ARE PROMISING THAT WE WILL DRAW LINE AT NEXT EC ISSUE, FOR EXAMPLE VOTING RIGHTS OF BERLIN DELEGATES IN NEW PARLIAMENT, AND THAT A SENSE OF BETRAYAL COULD COLOR THEIR
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 USBERL 01939 03 OF 03 161619Z

REACTION TO OUR APPROVAL OF FUTURE SMALL STEPS. WE WOULD THINK, HOWEVER, THAT CAREFUL PRESENTATIONS COULD OVERCOME THIS RISK AND THAT OUR PRIMARY INTEREST IS TO ENCOURAGE SOVIETS TO EXTENT POSSIBLE TO LOOK AT ISSUES ONE BY ONE AS THEY ARISE. THEY WOULD THEN HAVE TO CALCULATE WHETHER ANY PARTICULAR SMALL STEP WAS WORTH A MAJOR BERLIN CONFRONTATION THAT COULD CALL INTO QUESTION QA'S EFFECTIVENESS AND LARGER ISSUES OF THEIR DETENTE POLICY OR WHETHER THEY SHOULD RESTRAIN THEIR CONCERN THAT WE MIGHT BE ENTICING THEM INTO RIDE ON SLIPPERY SLOPE. IF OUR INTERPRETATION OF RECENT SOVIET STATEMENTS, INCLUDING IN PARTICULAR ABRASIMOV'S ANNIVERSARY PIECE, IS CORRECT, AFTER ALL, DYNAMICS ARE ON OUR SIDE SINCE SOVIETS DO NOT SEEM TO US PRESENTLY EAGER TO TAMPER WITH BASIC STRUCTURE OF QA UNLESS ALLIES OR DRAMATIC EVENTS IN BRUSSELS CONFIRM THEIR FEARS THAT THEIR LONG-RANGE STRATEGY AND PERCEPTION OF QA IS DEFECTIVE.

12. WE RECOGNIZE THAT ABOVE IS ESSENTIALLY A FAIRLY OPTIMISTIC READING OF WHAT ARE AT BEST AMBIGUOUS CLUES AND WOULD WELCOME OBSERVATIONS OF ADDRESSEES, PARTICULARLY THOSE OF EMBASSIES MOSCOW AND BERLIN ON SOVIET AND GDR MOTIVATIONS. TO FACILITATE THIS, WE ARE TRANSMITTING OUR UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION OF ABRASIMOV ARTICLE BY AIRGRAM.

GEORGE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: REPORTS, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION, INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 16 SEP 1976
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: ElyME
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1976USBERL01939
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D760349-1059
From: USBERLIN
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1976/newtext/t19760951/aaaabrwj.tel
Line Count: 494
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION EUR
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 9
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: ElyME
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 01 APR 2004
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <01 APR 2004 by BoyleJA>; APPROVED <13 AUG 2004 by ElyME>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
04 MAY 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: RECENT SOVIET STATEMENTS ON QA AND EC--IS THERE A NEW POLICY?
TAGS: PFOR, PGOV, WB, UR, EEC
To: BONN
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006